Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 22

Issue 2

Article 3

4-1-2005

Unselfish Salvation: Levinas, Kierkegaard, and the Place of SelfFulfillment in Ethics
Cristopher Arroyo

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Arroyo, Cristopher (2005) "Unselfish Salvation: Levinas, Kierkegaard, and the Place of Self-Fulfillment in
Ethics," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 22 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200522249
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol22/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

UNSELFISH SALVATION:
LEVINAS, KIERKEGAARD, AND THE PLACE
OF SELF-FULFILLMENT IN ETHICS
Christopher Arroyo

Levinas' ethics is often seen as implying a radical altruism, one which leaves
no room for the subject's self-fulfillment. In fact, Levinas rejects Kierkegaard's
ethics precisely because of the latter's concern for salvation and its seemingly
egoistic implications. However, I argue (1) that Levinas misreads Kierkegaard
on the issue of salvation, (2) that Kierkegaard's ethics and notion of salvation
are non-egoistic and leave room for a notion of self-fulfillment that does not
corrupt his selfless ethics, and (3) that Levinas, despite standard readings, creates a similar place for self-fulfillment in his description of the face to face
encounter with th.e Other.

All philosophy is justification of oneself. The only original philosophy would be the
one that would justify someone else.
Albert Camus!
If we were to adopt Camus' criterion for an original philosophy, then it
would seem quite appropriate to call the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas original. For Levinas does not hesitate in criticizing the history of Western philosophy for being primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the experiencing, knowing, and acting subject. Levinas offers a radical alternative to
this tradition by formulating an ethics that privileges the Other over the I,
drawing attention to the radical asymmetry that obtains between the subject and the absolutely Other. It is this grounding of morality on the
absolutely Other, seemingly to the detriment of the subject, that makes
Levinas' philosophy novel.
Perhaps another candidate for the kind of originality we are attributing
to Levinas would be the ethics Kierkegaard formulates in Works of Love. 2
Recognizing this similarity, M. Jamie Ferreira maintains that it is reasonable
to "argue that the notion of the absolute and unconditional duty to love all
without exception, dominating self-love's selfish preferential love (which
we find in Kierkegaard), is parallel to the notion of absolute and unconditional and infinite demand placed on us by the very existence of the other
(which we find in Levinas)."3 There are many striking similarities between
the ethics found in Works of Love and the one found in Totality and Infinity;
yet we find a significant objection to Kierkegaard's thought in the work of
Levinas himself. At the very end of Totality and Infinity, Levinas makes one
of the very few references to Kierkegaard in this work. He writes:
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The I is conserved then in goodness, without its resistance to system
manifesting itself as the egoist cry of the subjectivity, still concerned
for happiness or salvation, as in Kierkegaard. To posit being as Desire
is to decline at the same time the ontology of isolated subjectivity and
the ontology of impersonal reason realizing itself in history.5
Despite the seemingly Other-focused ethics of neighborly love found in
Kierkegaard, Levinas takes issue with the Danish thinker's inclusion of an
apparent concern for one's own salvation in the latter's discussion of ethics.
This concern reveals, according to Levinas, traces of egoism in Kierkegaard's
thought that Levinas rejects in his own account of the ethicaP
On most readings of Totality and Infinity it appears that Levinas successfully purges from his account of the Ethical Relation anything remotely
resembling what the eudaimonistic tradition has understood as happiness
(even happiness as understood by Kantian deontology). Inasmuch as this
is the case, there is a striking difference between Kierkegaard's ethics and
Levinas'; one might go so far as to say that insofar as an original ethics
should purify itself of such selfish concerns, Levinas' account proves more
innovative.
The aim of this paper is to reveal how Levinas, although offering a radical ethics of the Other, is not significantly different from Kierkegaard on
the issue of "salvation," for he has created a space for happiness or fulfillment as understood within the Aristotelian eudaimonistic tradition.' In
order to do this I will first discuss Levinas' notion of egoism and its corresponding notions of "freedom" as they are described in his treatment of
Ontology and Enjoyment. I will contrast the egoism of Enjoyment with the
selflessness of Desire as it appears in Levinas' metaphYSical relation, drawing attention to how he seemingly precludes any notion of happiness from
the Ethical. I will then move on to an examination of Kierkegaard's ethics
in Works of Love, drawing attention to how he, too, rejects an egoistical
ethics. Discussing the role of salvation therein, I will argue that it cannot
be characterized as a concern for "happiness" as Levinas understands it.
Finally, working from the understanding of salvation found in
Kierkegaard, I shall argue that, in his account of the Ethicat Levinas does
in fact have a space for a notion of fulfillment of the self.

Enjoyment, Happiness, and Desire
As mentioned above, Levinas offers us an ethics that grounds itself in the
Other. In his effort to develop his ethics, he is diligent in avoiding what he
terms "Egoism." Egoism, as Levinas articulates it is the subject'S exclusive
concern with itself, which is manifested in a variety of ways throughout
the history of philosophy. One such way is through Ontology. Ontology
involves "a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle
and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being." s Ontology
reveals egoism at the level of representation or theoretical philosophy, for
it is in my attempt to understand the world that I also seek to com-prehend
it; that is to say, through the application of concepts I make the world my
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own, reduce its otherness to sameness by incorporating it into my being.
What is interesting to note is that ontology, through its reduction of the
other to the same, "promotes freedom-freedom that is the identification
of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other."9 "That reason
in the last analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralizing
the other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid
down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing other limits
it."IO As we shall see, this freedom is not authentic freedom, for it is
grOlmded on a more fundamental freedom, the freedom that arises at the
Ethical relation. Although Ontology reveals the egoism that Levinas is so
wary of, it is not the only level at which egoism plays a dominant role.
Egoism is perhaps most strongly characteristic of what Levinas calls
Enjoyment, and this is where he locates the subject's search for happiness.
Levinas provides us with a telling description of the egoism that permeates
Enjoyment early in the text: liThe possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is only at first other, an other relative to
me, is the way of the same. I am at home with myself in the world because
it offers itself to or resists possession." 1l In Enjoyment, I am concerned
solely with my needs. I seek to satisfy them, and I see the world I inhabit
and the objects it contains simply as means to this end. Levinas' preferred
image for articulating these needs is through nourishment, for it "is the
transmutation of the other into the same, which is the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as other, recognized, we will see
as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment,
my own energy, my strength, me."ll It is significant that the wants and
desires the I seeks to satisfy in Enjoyment are primarily, if not exclusively,
sensual, for this helps to underscore the self-centeredness of Enjoyment. 13
And the satisfaction of these wants and desires is equated with happiness.
"Behind theory and practice there is enjoyment of theory and practice: the
egoism of life. The final relation is enjoyment, happiness."14
Given Levinas' characterization of Enjoyment and happiness as a concern with satisfying wants and desires, it is fair to say that Levinas' notion
of happiness is very Kantian. In fact, Levinas' definition of happiness is
identical with Kant's. "Happiness is made up not of an absence of needs,
whose tyranny and imposed character one denounces, but of the satisfaction of all needs."ls In fact, Levinas associates happiness with what he
terms "Need", and Need is much like Kant's understanding of sensible
inclinations and desires. "Need indicates void and lack in the needy one,
its dependence on the exterior, the insufficiency of the needy being precisely that it does not entirely possess its being .... "16 Because happiness is the
end that Enjoyment seeks, and because happiness is achieved only through
the satisfaction of my needs, Enjoyment exhibits a strong tendency to egoism, for I see the other exclusively as a means to my end: "Everything is
here, everything belongs to me."17 Once again, the I seeks to reduce the
other to the same. Yet, it is important to note that, for Levinas, myexperiencing enjoyment and feeling at home in the world is a step on the way to
recognizing the Ethical. lR Yet it is still a concern primarily for myself, my
well-being and my happiness, that constitutes Enjoyment.
In describing Enjoyment, Levinas uses the phrase "living from .. .. This
fT

UNSELFISH SALVATION

163

phrase"delineates independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and
of its happiness, which is the original pattern of all independence."lY In
describing ontology, we noted that egoism reveals itself as the tendency to
reduce the other to the same, and in this tendency purports to affirm freedom·-at least as it is understood at the level of representation. This same
kind of affirmation of freedom takes place in Enjoyment. In living from the
things I find in the world, in taking possession of them and using them as a
means to my happiness, I am asserting my independence and "freedom".
In taking possession I am "at home," yet this home "is not a container but a
site where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite
this dependence or thanks to it, free."20 Of course, as with ontology, the freedom that is asserted is inauthentic inasmuch as it is grounded on a more
fundamental freedom, that which is found in the Ethical relation. But we
must postpone a discussion of this freedom until later.
We have seen how Need characterizes the egoism that is present within
Enjoyment. It is this understanding of Need that Levinas contrasts with
Desire. In Need, the I seeks to satisfy its inclinations and wants, such as the
need for food, drink, a home, etc. On the contrary, Desire cannot be satisfied, for it is a desire for something that does not indicate a drive to possess
or reduce the Other but rather "tends towards something else entirely,
toward the absolutely other."21 Metaphysical desire "desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness-the Desired does not
fulfill it, but deepens it."22 Desire is fundamentally different from the Need
characteristic of Enjoyment and happiness: "in need I can sink my teeth into
the real and satisfy myself in assimilating the other; in Desire there is no
sinking one's teeth into being, no satiety, but an uncharted future before
me."23 Desire is radically different from Need because it is completely selfless, concerned exclusively with the Other. It is not a craving for sensual
satisfaction but is a "Desire for the Infinite which the desirable arouses
rather than satisfies. A Desire perfectly disinterested-goodness."24
Given these descriptions of the Desire one has for the Other, it comes as
no surprise when we find Levinas asserting that this Desire "is absolutely
non-egoist."25 And here is where we see how there can be no place for happiness at the level of the Ethical relation, at least insofar as Levinas has
defined happiness. For happiness, because of its essential connection with
Need, necessarily involves egoism and the drive to possess the other in
order to use the other as a means to satisfying my egoistical drives.
Levinas sees such egoism inherent in the self's "concern" for salvation as
described by Kierkegaard. Yet one may ask whether Kierkegaard's "preoccupation with salvation" is justly characterized as a concern for happiness-as Levinas understands it. Furthermore, one may inquire as to
whether there is a space within the Ethical for the kind of fulfillment or
"happiness" that is more characteristic of the eudaimonistic tradition. And
in order to answer both questions we must turn to an examination of
Kierkegaard's ethics in Works oj Love in order to draw out its similarities
with Levinas' ethics, so that we may investigate into the nature of
Kierkegaard's concern for salvation.
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Perhaps in examining Kierkegaard's ethics in Works of Love it would be best
to begin where he does, namely with the opening prayer. We find at the end
of the prayer a succinct characterization of an authentic work of love: "[B]ut
in heaven no work can be pleasing unless it is a work of love: sincere in selfrenunciation, a need in love itself, and for that very reason without any claim
of meritoriousness!"26 Even in this short passage we can see strong similarities with Levinas. First of all, it is important to note that Kierkegaard rejects
an ethics concerned with improper self-love (i.e., EgOism), as does Levinas.
His next statement regarding the need of love may seem to belie this selfrenunciation, but, as we will see, this need should be understood more akin
to Levinas' Desire rather than his notion of Need. 27 Finally, In opposition to
the reading Levinas gives him, Kierkegaard insists that a true work of love
makes no claim to meritoriousness.
If Levinas is highly critical of the egoism that pervades Enjoyment, then
Kierkegaard is just as critical of the self-love that infects what he calls preferential love, namely erotic love and friendship. Kierkegaard calls these
two kinds of love preferential because each "has preference's name, 'the
beloved/ 'the friend/ who is loved in contrast to the whole world."28 It is
because the beloved is different in certain respects from other persons that
she is loved. "Just as self-love selfishly embraces this one and only self that
makes it self-love, so also erotic love's passionate preference selfishly encircles this one and only beloved, and friendship's passionate preference
encircles this one and only friend."29
But the problem with preferential love is deeper than this, for preferential or celebrated love is motivated by self-love. Celebrated love is driven
by a one's needs and inclinations, by the need to be loved in return by the
beloved, and it is under the guise of "altruistic" erotic or philial love that
the self pursues these needs and inclinations. "In the beloved and the
friend, it of course is not the neighbor who is loved, but the other I, or the
first lance again, but more intensely."30 Although Kierkegaard does not
speak of self-love in terms of the satisfaction of basic needs, as Levinas
does, there is fundamental agreement between the two thinkers on this
issue. For Kierkegaard, the self seeks to possess the beloved for himself,
and in this way, his account of self-love is analogous to Egoism as discussed in Levinas. Where a difference between the two thinkers begins to
emerge is in Kierkegaard's remedy for this self-love, for the commandment
is not merely to love the neighbor but to "love the neighbor as yourself."
Here is a point where Levinas would take issue with Kierkegaard's ethics,
for it appears that it is still infected with Egoism insofar as love for the
neighbor is connected with love of the self, despite Kierkegaard's insistence that it be "proper" self-love.
In his own defense, Kierkegaard is quick to qualify what is meant by "as
yourself." "Christianity presupposes that a person loves himself and then
adds to this only the phrase about the neighbor as yourself. And yet there is
a change of eternity between the former and the latter."3! The "self-love"
involved with the commandment to love the neighbor as oneself is radically different from the self-love one finds in celebrated or preferential love.
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In fact, it is a misrepresentation to call this "loving as oneself" self-love.
"[I]f one is to love he neighbor as oneself, then the commandment, as with a
pick, wrenches open the lock of self-love and wrests it away from a person."32 In fact, Kierkegaard describes the Christian commandment to love
the neighbor as oneself as an exercise in "self-denial, which is Christianity's
essential form."33 This self-denial, which is essential to the Christian call to
love, is what precludes loving oneself from being infected by improper
self-love. It is not the case that in loving the neighbor as myself I merely
think of the ways in which I need to be loved and then simply love the
neighbor in these ways; rather, there is a "change of eternity" between the
self-love of preferential love and this notion of loving as oneself.
Yet there remains a passage in Kierkegaard that would lead one to
believe that although he seeks to purge his ethics of any self-love or egoism
he does not truly respect the alterity of the neighbor, for the neighbor is
understood in terms of the self. "The concept of the 'neighbor' is actually
the redoubling of your own self; 'the neighbor is what thinkers call 'the
other,' that by which the selfishness in self-love is to be tested."'" It would
be very easy to read this passage as indicative of Kierkegaard falling into
the tendency to reduce the other to the same. Yet, given his categorical
rejection of self-love, it would be more consistent with the ethics outlined
thus far to read him as merely emphasizing in a slightly different way
what he has already said about loving the neighbor as oneself-a loving,
which I have argued, is in fact not egoistic. 35 This point is brought to light
further in the text where Kierkegaard writes, "Whether we speak of the
first lor of the other I, we do not come a step closer to the neighbor, because
the neighbor is the first you.""
Still, the question arises as to what is meant by this" change of eternity"
Kierkegaard speaks of, for it is this difference that purports to purge selflove/egoism from the love of the neighbor. Here we arrive at the most
striking difference between Kierkegaard and Levinas. As is well known,
Levinas articulates an ethics of the absolutely Other, an Other that is my
human other, my neighbor. Kierkegaard offers an ethics that is grounded
on the absolutely Other as well, yet his absolutely Other is not my human
neighbor but God.37 God stands as the "middle term" between the neighbor and myself, making the difference of eternity. The essential role of
God in loving the neighbor is brought to light by Kierkegaard in the following passage:

Worldly wisdom is of the opinion that love is a relationship between persons;
Christianity teaches that love is relationship between; a person-God-a
person, that is, that God is the middle term. However beautiful a relationship of love has been between two people or among many, however complete all their desire and all their bliss have been for themselves in mutual sacrifice and devotion, even though everyone has
praised this relationship-if God and the relationship with God have
been omitted, then this, in the Christian sense, has not been love but a
mutually enchanting defraudation of 10ve.38
It is only in relating to the neighbor through God that one may achieve an
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authentic work of love. 39 God stands as this middle term because God is
the "God of love, source of all love in heaven and on earth ... you who are
love, so that one who loves is what he is only by being in yoU."40
Of course, we must now ask what this relationship with God consists of,
and with this question we may now turn to the charge Levinas makes
against Kierkegaard regarding the latter's concern for personal salvation.
From what we have seen thus far, it would appear that this charge would,
in the very least, be in tension with the selfless ethic Kierkegaard presents
us with. But one sees a potential ground for Levinas' critique in
Kierkegaard's elaboration on the self's relationship with God and his discussion of hope. Kierkegaard, in the third chapter of the Second Series of
Works of Love, asserts that love hopes all things. He goes on to describe this
notion of hope as relating "to the future, to possibility ... the possibility of
advance or retrogression, of rising or falling, of good or of evil."41 To be
sure, this hope is in one sense directed toward the neighbor, concerned
with her goodness. But Kierkegaard also says, "Christianity's hope is eternity, and Christ is the Way; his debasement is the Way, but he was also the
Way when he ascended into heaven."42 Here, then, we see why Levinas
thinks that Kierkegaard is ultimately concerned with salvation; for in love's
hope it appears that the self loves in order to achieve eternal salvation in
union with God.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard discusses this notion of hope in relation to
despair. For him, "despair is the lack of the eternal."43 So it would seem
that only in obeying God's commandment to love the neighbor, only in
relating to (i.e., loving) God in "the right way" can the self secure itself
against despair. Hence, it appears that Kierkegaard implicitly introduces
into his ethics an egoistic motive on the part of the self in obeying God's
commandment. However, Kierkegaard goes on to characterize despair,
not as a lack of "happiness" (as Levinas understands it) in the subject, but
as "a misrelation in a person's innermost being ... For this reason there is
only one security against despair: to undergo the change of eternity
through duty's shall."44 Of course, one could read this statement as asserting the kind of egoism that Levinas sees in Kierkegaard's ethics. But as I
stated above, to quickly dismiss Kierkegaard's discussion of hope and
despair as a reversion to egoism would be to grossly ignore the detailed
arguments he gives against love that is motivated by self-love.
So how should one read Kierkegaard's discussion of hope? It should be
dear from the discussion above that, like Levinas, Kierkegaard argues for
an essentially relational self, not the autonomous self that is so distinctive
of classical modern philosophy; this is apparent in his description of
despair as a "misrelation." Moreover, we must remember that thus far
Kierkegaard's understanding of the divine command to love the neighbor
is not motivated by self-love but arises from a proper relation to God that
leads us to selflessly obey God's command. "Yet only in self-denial can
one effectually praise love, because God is love, and only in self-denial can
one hold fast to God .. .in self-denial he must become (since self-denial is
related to the universally human and thus is distinguished from the particular call and election), an instrument for God."45 Therefore, when
Kierkegaard speaks of the hope of the lover for the eternal and the eternal
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as correcting this misrelation within the self, this should not be seen as the
motivation for the self's actions but rather as an unintended consequence to
participating in an authentic love relationship with God and the neighbor.
The lover does not love the neighbor and God in order}o receive eternal salvation or right relation within himself; rather, this right relation, this
authentic selfhood, comes about as a "side effect," for lack of a better
term:" Of course, this "side effect" does indeed have consequences for the
self, for it is now in right relation to God, neighbor, and itself, and, therefore, is authentic, but in no way does the self in his obeying the commandment pursue this "right relation".
This reading of the role of hope and salvation in Kierkegaard's ethics is
further supported by his repeated emphasis that the command to love
must not be obeyed out of requirement for reward-it must be self-sacrificing." Kierkegaard considers the possibility of requiring a reward from the
beloved neighbor, even a reward that is love in return. No such reward
may be expected:" He asserts that commanded love "belongs entirely to
God, or in it the person belongs entirely to God," yet,
There is only one who sees the true connectedness, and he does not
admire, since God in heaven does not admire any human being. On
the contrary, while the true sacrifice has only one single abodeGod-it nevertheless in tum seems to be forsaken by God, because it
understands that before God it has no merit at all ... .'9
So it is not the case that by obeying the command to love that one impresses God and therefore merits salvation. If the self does in fact receive salvation, if it does gain right relation within itself because of its relation to the
eternal, this is not because it is concerned with its own "happiness" or
eudaimonia but rather because right relation with God is the sole intended
effect on the part of the self in its effort to selflessly obey God's command.5O
It is with this understanding of the non-egoistical role of salvation in
Kierkegaard's ethics that we can now return to Levinas and inquire as to
whether his ethics contains a space for such a conception of "salvation."

Conclusion: Levinas' Face to Face and the Other as "Savior"
We have seen how Levinas, in formulating his ethics of the Other, has
repeatedly insisted on the radically selfless position the subject must take
towards the Other. I have sought to draw attention to this through a discussion of Levinas' critique of egoism. One thing which has been emphasized throughout this discussion, both in the Egoism that reveals itself in
Ontology's drive to reduce the Other to the same and the Egoism that
seeks to possess the Other in an effort to use the Other as a means to its
happiness, is the self's repeated attempts to promote or assert its freedom.
Yet freedom as it is asserted in Ontology and Enjoyment is not authentic
freedom, for these kinds of freedom are grounded on a more fundamental
freedom, the freedom which arises in the Ethical relation. It is in his discussion of this fundamental freedom, which grounds all freedom, that
Levinas reveals a space within his ethics for a notion of fulfillment or salva-

168

Faith and Philosophy

tion as I have argued appears in Kierkegaard's ethics.
It would seem that the relationship Levinas presents us with in his
description of metaphysical Desire would not only preclude Egoism or a
concern with oneself but also lead to an oppression of the self in its recognition of its obligation to the Other. That is to say, it appears that in
acknowledging its debt to the Other, the self not only renounces its own
claim to freedom (the freedom that occurs in Representation or Enjoyment)
but also is oppressed by the Other. 51 Yet we find Levinas asserting at the
beginning of Totality and Infinity that "This book then does present itself as
a defense of subjectivity, but it will apprehend this subjectivity ... as founded
in the idea of infinity."52 So how does Levinas reconcile this seemingly
oppressive encounter with the Other and his assertion that he is defending
subjectivity? He is sensitive to this issue and addresses it in the chapter
titled, "Ethics and the Face." He reassures us that the Other "does not
purely and simply negate the I."51 Moreover, he continues, "The resistance
of the other does not do violence to me, does not act negatively; it has a
positive structure: ethical.. .. I do not struggle with a faceless God but I
respond to his expression, to his revelation."54 It is in this positive ethical
relation that Levinas reveals the place for the self's fulfillment in his ethics.
It is the Ethical relation that grounds the freedom of the I, but not
because it is within this relation that the autonomous I truly asserts its freedom; rather, freedom is grounded in the Ethical because it is only in the
face to face encounter that I receive my freedom. "But the absolutely
other-the Other-does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to
responsibility, it founds it and justifies it. The relation with the other as
face heals allergy."ss Levinas also says that "in expression the being that
imposes itself does not limit but promotes my freedom, by arousing my
goodness. The order of responsibility, where the gravity of ineluctable
being freezes all laughter, is also the order where freedom is ineluctably
invoked."56
Here we see that despite Levinas' insistence on the non-egoistic nature
of Desire and the selflessness that characterizes the Ethical relation, the self
does in fact receive from the Other the very freedom it has sought to promote throughout Levinas' analysis. Might one not say that within
Ontology and Enjoyment, insofar as these are seen as being the ultimate
grounds of freedom, the self is in a "fundamental misrelation"? Is it not
the case that in opening up to and entering into the right relation with the
infinite Other (the eternal for Kierkegaard), this misrelation is corrected?
And, in this sense, could not one describe the self as receiving "salvation"
from the Other, achieving a fulfillment that does not qualify as sensual
happiness yet nevertheless brings the self out of "despair" into right relation with the Other, thereby fulfilling the self?
It is not surprising that Levinas avoids this kind of language in discussing the founding of the self's freedom in the absolutely Other, for his
writings are an attempt to overcome the egoism that has infected Western
philosophy. Yet given the role salvation plays in Kierkegaard, namely not
one of sensual self-satisfaction but one of unintended self-fulfillment, it
seems that in designating the Other as the giver of my freedom Levinas has
created a space for a fulfillment of the self, a kind of "happiness". And we
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can, therefore, see that despite the initial appearance of stark dissimilarity
on this issue, both Kierkegaard and Levinas are more in agreement than
their readers have been led to believe. 57
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philosophy, especially Kant's notion of autonomy.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 38.
12. Ibid., 111.
13. "[T]he independence of happiness, always depends on a content: it is
the joy or the pain of breathing, looking, eating, working, handling the hammer and the machine, etc." (TI, 110).
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14. n 113. Cf. 115, "Enjoyment, in relation with nourishment, which is
the other of life, is an independence sui generis, the independence of happiness."
15. TI,115.
16. Ibid., 102. Cf. Groundwork 4: 399 where Kant discusses happiness and
need in a similar fashion. A difference between Kant and Levinas obtains
because of the dualism the former sets up between sensible and rational
nature. Kant is more adamant in his insistence that these needs pose a serious
threat to one's ability to obey the moral law, whereas Levinas paints a less grim
picture of Need and Enjoyment (see notes 6 and 18).
17. TI,37.
18. The specifics of Levinas' argument as to how one moves from
Enjoyment, via labor and dwelling, to the Ethical are not of concern here. It is
important to realize that insofar as Enjoyment does allow one to move from a
preoccupation with one's own happiness to recognizing the Ethical relation,
Enjoyment and happiness are not in and of themselves evil. Levinas states that
"Happiness is a condition for activity" (113), and as this condition, it is not evil.
Levinas goes so far as to say a human being "thrives on his needs; he is happy
for his needs" (114).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

n

110.
Ibid., 37, emphasis mine.
Ibid., 33.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 117.
24.
Ibid., 50.
25. Ibid., 67.
26. Smen Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. and ed. by Howard V. Hong
and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) 4. Hereafter this
work will be referred to as VVL.
27. Ferreira makes this comparison as well. LGS, 26-7.
28. VVL, 19. Cf. p. 63, "Forsake the dissimilarities so that you can love the
neighbor." Although this was not emphasized above, Levinas also warns
against preferences based on differences. In Totality and Infinity he speaks of
the "nudity of the face," where this should be understood as an abstracting
from all personal and individual differences (e.g., gender, race, culture, religion, etc.) that might lead one to judge or prefer the Other in a biased fashion.
"The things are naked, by metaphor, only when they are without adornments:
bare walls, naked landscapes" (TI, 74).
29. VVL,53.
30. Ibid., 57
31. Ibid., 18.
32. Ibid., 17.
33. Ibid., 56.
34. Ibid.,21. It is interesting to note that there may be yet another similarity between Levinas and Kierkegaard on this score, for the concept of "substitution" discussed in Levinas' Otherwise Than Being, has many striking similarities to Kierkegaard's notion of the "redoubling of the self". I thank Amy Leigh
Peters for drawing my attention to this similarity.
35. Ferreira points out that the command to love the neighbor "more than
yourself" is in fact inconsistent with a non-egoistical ethics. She states that this
is so for two reasons. First of all, only God is capable of loving more than himself. Secondly, we should never obey another human being unconditionally,
for often times this would lead us to be complicit in allowing another person to
pander to human weakness. LGS, 130-131.
36. VVL, 57. Cf. 53. "For this reason the beloved and the friend are called,
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remarkably and profoundly, to be sure, the other self, the other I-since the
neighbor is the other you, or, quite precisely, the third party of equality." The
difference in language used by Kierkegaard is meant to emphasize the selflessness of neighborly love as opposed to the selfishness of self-love. The description of the neighbor as "third party" will be discussed below in my treatment
of God as the "middle term" in the love relationship.
37. It is interesting to note that there is a passage where Kierkegaard
speaks of the neighbor as "eternity's mark on every human being" (89). This
seems to echo the trace of the divine in the Other that Levinas speaks of, yet,
for Kierkegaard, this "mark" can only be seen "by means of eternity's light"
(i.e., through right relation to God).
38. WL,106-7.
39. Some critics of Kierkegaard fault him for his insistence that God is the
"middle term." They charge that such an understanding of the self's relationship to the neighbor reduces the neighbor to nothing more than an occasion to
love God. Ferreira gives an extended and nuanced discussion of what
Kierkegaard means by "God as the middle term" and how he is not susceptible
to this criticism. See LGS, 71-6.
40. WL, 3. ct. p. 121 where Kierkegaard writes, "The love-relationship
requires threeness: the lover, the beloved, the love-but the love is God." M.
Jamie Ferreira effectively describes the role of God as "middle term" in Works
of Love when she writes, "What makes Christian devotedness to the other different [from merely human devotedness in the form of celebrated love] is that
our determinations of what counts as loving in a given case are stabilized by
relating first 'to God and God's requirement.'" LGS, 72.
41. lbid., 249.
42. Ibid., 248.
43. lbid., 41.
44. lbid., 40.
45. Ibid., 364.
46. The point I am arguing can be elucidated by reference to Aristotle's
discussion of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics Book X Chapter 4 sections 5
and 8. Aristotle argues that the pleasure which accompanies a certain activity
completes this good, but it does not do so in any intended or sought after way.
Rather, pleasure is "a sort of consequent end" (1l74b33-35).
47. WL,130.
48. In his criticism and rejection of preferential love, one point
Kierkegaard repeatedly makes is that preferential love is always reward. This
is especially true of his discussion of "exchange" within erotic and philial relationships, for "an exchange by no means abolishes the distinction 'mine and
yours,' because that for which r exchange myself then becomes mine again"
(WL,267).

49. WL,13l.
50. This "right relation" is directed towards the self's relation with God in
obeying his commandment and not with the self's own recovery from despair.
If one were concerned with one's own salvation from despair in the effort to
enter into right relation with God, this selfish concern would undermine that
effort. Moreover, anticipating my conclusion, it should be noted that Ferreira
gives a thoughtful discussion of the issue of merit/reward and "interestedness" in Kierkegaard and Levinas by drawing on Derrida's work on the concept of the "gift." LGS, 163-6.
51. In his discussion of infinite debt, Levinas is often charged with subjugating the I to the Other so radically that the I is no longer able to respond to
the Other as a moral agent (i.e., the self becomes "morally paralyzed" on
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Levinas' view). My argument is that Levinas' call to openness to the Other
does not necessarily preclude a self who is a moral agent; in fact, it is what
makes moral agency possible. A good defense of Levinas against the charge of
moral paralysis is offered by M. Jamie Ferreira in "'Total Altruism' in Levinas's
'Ethics of the Welcome,'" Journal of Religious Ethics 29.3 (2001): 443-470. Ferreira
makes a similar claim as mine using both the early and later published works
of Levinas, though her paper specifically defends Levinas against the version
of the "moral paralysis" critique put forth by Ricoeur.
52. TI, 26. Emphasis mine.
53. Ibid., 194.
54.
Ibid., 197.
55.
Ibid.
56.
Ibid., 201. Cf. 203.
57.
I would like to thank Dr. Merold Westphal and Amy Leigh Peters for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, though responsibility for its
shortcomings lies solely with me.

